Abstract-The k-anonymity approach adopted by k-Same face de-identification methods enables these methods to serve their purpose of privacy protection. However, it also forces every k original faces to share the same de-identified face, making it impossible to track individuals in a k-Same de-identified video. To address this issue, this paper presents an approach to the creation of distinguishable de-identified faces. This new approach can serve privacy protection perfectly whilst producing deidentified faces that are as distinguishable as their original faces.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the recent years, a growing number of service providers are starting to share and utilize multimedia content for research, business, security and many other purposes. For example, surveillance footages are often used as evidence in law enforcement. Healthcare homes are sharing videos of patients to conduct analysis of common symptoms as well as to inform research for better diagnoses and treatments. Online storage and sharing of personal images and videos have become an integral part of the modern, mobile life in the Cloud age. However, this evolvement has inevitably ignited concerns about the privacy of information in the course of storing and/or distributing such data. This growing concern and the associated legal and ethical responsibilities have led to considerable interest and effort in the field of face de-identification over the last decade. The aim of face de-identification is to conceal the original identities of the faces captured in a given image or video with new facial identities generated synthetically.
To date, the most cited face de-identification methods are solutions in the k-Same family, where privacy protection is achieved by implementing the theory of k-anonymity [1] . Examples of k-Same algorithms include k-Same-Pixels [2] , kSame-Eigen [2] , k-Same-M [3] and k-Same-furthest [4] . In a kSame face de-identification process, the set of original face images is firstly partitioned into clusters of size k. For each cluster formed, an aggregate face is then used to de-identify all the k members in the cluster. In other words, each group of k original faces would share the same de-identified face and hence the name 'k-Same' for this family of methods. Typically, the performance of a face de-identification method is evaluated in terms of the recognition rate of its de-identified faces against the originals. The lower the recognition rate, the better the privacy protection is. As each de-identified face is replicated k times for all the originals in its cluster and each de-identified face can only be matched with one original during recognition, the correct matching for each de-identified face can at best be 1 in k times. This k-anonymity approach has enabled k-Same methods to guarantee a recognition rate lower than 1/k while this guaranteed recognition rate has been further reduced to zero, i.e. perfect privacy protection has been achieved, by the k-Same-furthest method [4] -a new addition to the k-Same family.
Although the k repetition of each de-identified sample has enabled the k-Same methods to serve their purpose of privacy protection, the repetition also makes the k-Same de-identified faces undistinguishable. To be more specific, several different individuals will appear to be the same person, making it impossible to track an individual in a k-Same de-identified video. To address this common drawback of k-Same methods, this paper presents a new method for face de-identification. This new method guarantees perfect privacy protection by adopting the approach of the k-Same-furthest method, while facilitating the provision of unique distinguishable deidentified faces across all individuals.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the k-Same framework and the k-Same-furthest method. Section 3 describes the new distinguishable face deidentification method and proves that this new method can always achieve a zero recognition rate. Section 4 evaluates the proposed algorithm's ability to protect privacy through experiments and compare the diversity of the de-identified face images with that of the originals. Finally, the findings of this work are summarized and further discussed in Section 5.
II. K-SAME DE-IDENTIFICATION

A. Face De-identification Definition and Notations
To facilitate comparisons, this paper adopts the notations from Newton et al.'s paper [1] on the first k-Same method. This set of notations has been used in many succeeding publications on face de-identification, including the k-Samefurthest method [4] . The definition of face de-identification given in [1] is quoted here.
Definition Face De-identification (Definition 2.6 in [1] ). Let and be face sets, Γ , Γ , : be a function that attempts to conceal the identity of the subject of the original face image; and, Γ Γ but Γ Γ (elementwise). is termed face de-identification. Γ is a de-identified image.
B. k-Same-furthest Face De-identification
The k-Same's guarantee of a recognition rate lower than 1/k is achieved by replicating each Γ k times regardless of the clustering of [2] . This implies that even random clustering would not affect the effectiveness of k-Same in terms of privacy protection. However, to minimize information loss, all k-Same methods form clusters in with homogeneous faces [1] and calculate each de-identified face Γ as the average of a cluster.
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The k-Same-furthest paper named all the k-Same methods prior to it 'k-Same-closest'. This is due to the fact that all these methods de-identify an original face with the centroid of its own cluster (i.e. the cluster that is closest to the origial face). However, instead of maximizing the loss/removal of identity information, this approach actually minimizes identity loss. When no overlapping exists between any two clusters, the algorithms will always lead to a recognition rate equal to the theoretical maximum of 1/k. When overlapping exists between two clusters the centroid of a cluster can be closest to an original face from the overlapping cluster, reducing the recognition rate of k-Same-closest in such special cases. This is confirmed by the experimental results published for the kSame-closest methods where their recognition rates tend to stay just below the 1/k curve. To maximize the removal of identity information in the original face images, the k-Same-furthest method de-identifies each original image Γ with the average of the cluster that is, identity-wise, furthest away from it. The k-Same-furthest de-identification process is iterative. In each iteration, two clusters are formed and de-identified with the average of the other cluster. The clustering process in kSame-furthest ensures a maximum distance between these two clusters. Fig. 1 illustrates an iteration of the k-Same-furthest deidentification process with a 2D data set. To best serve its goal of privacy protection, this approach is adopted here in the proposed method for the purpose of achieving perfect privacy protection with the de-identified faces. 
III. DISTINGUISHABLE DE-IDENTIFIED FACES
A. The propsed k-Diff-furthest Algorithm
This section presents an approach to distinguishable deidentified faces. On the one hand, it adopts the iterative process of k-Same-furthest in terms of forming two clusters of size k in each iteration and swapping their centroids. On the other hand, instead of de-identifying each complete cluster with the same face, this new approach generates a unique (different) deidentified face for each of the k original faces in a cluster. It is hence named k-Diff-furthest. Fig. 2 outlines the process flow of the proposed k-Diff-furthest algorithm.
Output:
A person specific face set and the privacy constraint , with | | 2 An Active Appearance Model ΑΑΜ · De-identified face set and its AAM projection Uses:
A face cluster Λ with a centroid at Λ and a radius of , a face cluster Λ with a centroid at Λ and a radius of , and dist Λ , Λ which is the distance between Λ and Λ . Steps: The proposed k-Diff-furthest algorithm transforms the given person-specific face set from the RGB pixel-based
space to a pre-trained Active Appearance Model (AAM) [5, 6] feature space where all the faces are aligned to a common face. It has been shown that representing original faces in an AAM space and performing face de-identification there can prevent ghost artefacts in the de-identified face effectively [3] . The AAM representation of the original face set is denoted as and its de-identified version as .
As shown in Fig. 2 , the k-Diff-furthest process is iterative. Like the k-Same-furthest method, k-Diff-furthest completes two tasks in each iteration. The first task is to form two clusters and in for the given original face Λ , where Λ is the trigger of the current iteration and is formed with faces closest to Λ while with those furthest from it. Once an original face is assigned to a cluster, it is removed from . The second task of each iteration is to generate a de-identified face Λ for each original in and .
In order to achieve a privacy protection level guaranteed to be better than 1/ , all the k-Same-closest methods [4] demand that each cluster formed in the de-identification process must contain at least k members. In contrast to these methods, kSame-furthest guarantees perfect privacy protection regardless of the value of k, by preventing overlapping between the two clusters formed in each iteration. k-Diff-furthest adopts this same approach and guarantees perfect privacy protection regardless of the value of k. Whenever a new member is added to the two clusters and each, k-Diff-furthest checks to see whether overlapping is caused by these two new members (line 15). If so, both new members are removed from their clusters and the clustering loop for both and is stopped as adding any other remaining face to or would cause even more overlapping between the two clusters. As a result, the size of the clusters formed in the k-Diff-furthest process might be smaller than k. Part B of this section proves the effectiveness of this approach in terms of privacy protection.
To maximize identity loss, k-Same-furthest de-identifies the originals in and by swapping the cluster centers. Whilst the same approach is adopted in k-Diff-furthest, the two methods differ in the way how the de-identified faces are computed. The k-Same-furthest algorithm implements kanonymity and uses the average of one cluster as the deidentified face for all the faces in the other cluster. Lines 30-39 in Fig. 2 details how the de-identified faces are computed in kDiff-furthest. As detailed by the pseudo code in Fig. 2 and illustrated by the example in Fig. 3 , the de-identification step in k-Diff-furthest is equivalent to moving original faces Λ in to their new centroid Λ with their relative locations to the centroid unchanged, i.e.
vector Λ Λ Λ Λ (1).
The same applies to the original faces in . Through this approach, k-Diff-furthest generates a unique de-identified face for each original face in and retains the diversity of in .
As it is assumed that original faces in are distinguishable, kDiff-furthest ensures that the de-identified faces in are equally distinguishable. 
B. Correctness of the k-Diff-furthest Algorithm
Theorem 1. Given a privacy constraint 1; a personspecific face set with | | 2 ; and a face set
is effective with respect to the following claim for any face image Γ k-Diff-furthest Γ, for Γ : Given that k-Diff-furthest uses dist , to measure the identity distance between any two faces and , there cannot exist any face recognition software that measures identity distance with dist , to correctly recognize the subject of Γ as Γ.
Proof. As stated, k-Diff-furthest measures dist , in an AAM feature space as dist Λ , Λ . The following proves that the de-identified face Λ k-Diff-furthest Λ , for any Λ will be recognized as an original Λ , i.e.
.
As demonstrated in Fig. 4 , the shaded half of must contain at least an original face Λ . Otherwise, the centroid Λ would have shifted into the un-shaded half of . Within the shaded half of , the furthest point to Λ is Λ , giving that
According to the Triangle Inequality Theorem,
. (4) and (5) gives
As illustrated in Fig. 3 , (1) 
Theorem 1 means that as long as the same is used in the face recognition software, guarantees to thwarts the face recognition s face in its regardless of the value of k.
It is worth mentioning that the last two o might not comply with (5) . When an origi satisfy condition (5), its de-identified versio (2) and might be recognized correctly as its explained in part A of this section, the k-Diffiterative. Once an original face is de-identif from . Clustering is carried out with the o in . This above mentioned situation may last two original faces in when they can without breaking condition (5) . Although e remaining original faces may form a cluste identification of these single-member cl equivalent to a simple exchange of identities faces. The de-identified face of person 1 wo the original face of person 2. Obviously, this To prevent this, single-member clusters are Diff-furthest by the process defined by line However, the compromise of this no singl policy in k-Diff-furthest means that privacy longer be guaranteed for the last two remain in when they cannot join or condition (5).
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Dataset
Experiments in this work were conducted from the IMM [7] and the LFPW data annotations of facial landmarks are given a data within the IMM dataset. For the LFPW annotations are provided by the 300 Faces W) Challenge [9] . The 68 points mark-up a annotation of both datasets (see row I of Fi dataset contains faces with uncontrolled expressions and illumination; whereas t (4) means that in k-
any original face Λ .
proved. Although . The same stands e distance measure k-Diff-furthest software for every original faces in inal face does not on will not satisfy s original face. As f-furthest process is fied, it is removed originals remaining only occur to the nnot join or each of these two er on its own, delusters would be between these two uld be identical to s is not acceptable. avoided in the kes 23-29 in Fig. 2 . le-member cluster protection can no ning original faces without breaking d with face images asets [8] . Manual as the ground-truth W dataset, manual In-the-Wild (300-are followed in the ig. 5). The LFPW head pose, facial the IMM dataset contains face images of 40 indi environment with six images frontal happy, left rotated neu light neutral and free style). A images in the LFPW dataset an images in the IMM dataset w AAM feature space in this work
Cropped face images (row region inside the outline of th used in the experiments. E represented as a 59-dimension feature space, with 9 dimension texture. The face images in th under various lighting condition the three LFPW images var brightness and some of them those from the IMM dataset. brightness, the AAM feature face images and 40 IMM face i dominant face texture feature brightness. Considering that th identity information whereas c face de-identification process the identity features of the face has been set arbitrarily to zero testing set. This is equivalent t equalization procedure that is image pre-processing process i identification. The cropped im images after brightness equaliza Like most k-Same face (including k-Same-Pixel/-Eige Same-furthest [4] ), the prop focuses on the de-identificatio faces. As a result, all imag evaluation of the k-Diff-furthes faces. The testing set of this images from the IMM dataset the LFPW dataset (see Fig. 5 replacing the three grayscale fa to remove the impact of the col of the de-identified faces. Fig. 5) showing only the he AAM-fitted face shape were Each cropped face image is nal vector in the trained AAM ns for face shape and 50 for face he LFPW dataset were captured ns. As shown on row I of Fig. 5 , ry in terms of overall image are significantly brighter than Due to this large variation in space trained with 783 LFPW images in this work has its most representing the overall image his feature does not contain any clustering of face images in the should be carried out based on es, the first AAM texture feature o for all the face images in the to the brightness (or histogram) typically applied as part of the in face recognition and face demages on row II of Fig. 5 are ation.
II of
e de-identification algorithms en [2] , k-Same-M [3] , and kosed k-Diff-furthest algorithm on of images of neutral frontal ges used in the experimental st algorithm are of neutral frontal work consists of the 37 colour and another three selected from columns (d-f)). The reason for ace images in the IMM dataset is lour format on the visual quality anually annotated facial landmarks
ion of images on row (I)
n the testing set of this work. (a -c) are d -f) from the IFPW dataset.
Although the k-Diff-furthest algorithm is proposed for neutral frontal faces only, additional measures can be applied to integrate the head poses, facial expressions and illumination of the original faces into the de-identified face image. For instance, replacing the single AAM in the k-Diff-furthest algorithm with a set of five view-based AAMs [10] will enable the algorithm to retain the horizontal head rotations in the deidentified faces. In addition, a facial expression transfer scheme [11] has been developed for the restoration of original facial expressions on the de-identified faces, which can be directly applied to the de-identified faces generated by the k-Difffurthest algorithm.
B. Perfect Privacy Protection by k-Diff-furthest 1) Test design
The privacy protection ability of the proposed k-Difffurthest algorithm is evaluated through recognition experiments using the Eigenface technique [12] in the AAM space, where the 40 original face images (all cropped) from the testing set are de-identified and the de-identified faces are then matched against all the original faces in the testing set. In the deidentification process, the original face that triggers each iteration (line 3 of Fig. 2 ) is randomly selected. All results reported are based on running the identification process 1000 times for each value of k. Fig. 6 shows the rank-1 recognition rates of the deidentified faces against their original faces. The k-Same-M algorithm is a k-Same-closest solution. But like k-Diff-furthest, it also performs face de-identification in the AAM space. As expected and confirmed in Fig. 6 , the recognition rate of the kSame-M de-identified faces always stays synchronized with and just below the theoretical maximum of 1/ . The same experimental results of recognition rate have been reported for all the other k-Same-closest face de-identification methods in their original papers [2, 3, 13] , forcing all k-Same-closest methods to use large values of k in order to achieve acceptable privacy protection. The recognition rates of k-Diff-furthest faces on the other hand are significantly lower than those of the k-Same-M faces. Fig. 7 is a zoomed-in version of Fig. 6 . Both Figs. 6 and 7 confirm that when single-member clusters are allowed, i.e. when all original faces satisfy condition (5), deidentified faces generated by k-Diff-furthest always yield a recognition rate of zero regardless of the value of k. When single-member clusters are not allowed and when the steps defined by lines 23-29 in Fig. 2 are carried out, the last two (out of 40) original faces may lead to a correct matching with their de-identified versions. However, as shown in Figs. 6 and 7, the probability for this to happen is lower than 0.4%.
2) Test results
C. Distinguishable De-identified Faces by k-Diff 1) Test design
To measure how diverse a set of face images is, the Euclidean distance between each image and every other image in the set is computed in the AAM space. This is the distance measure used in Eigenface and many other face recognition techniques. It indicates how distinguishable the faces are in terms of the facial features displayed in the images. The smaller the distance between two face images, the harder it becomes to distinguish the two faces in the images. Fig. 8 shows the histogram distribution of the facial feature distances among the original testing face images as well as their de-identified face images generated by k-Same-closest, kSame-furthest and the proposed k-Diff-furthest when 5. kSame-M is again used as the representative k-Same-closest method. There are 40 face images in the testing set, meaning each histogram in Fig. 8 shows the distribution of 780 facial feature distances. Table I lists the minimum, the maximum and the average distances as well as the standard deviation for each set of images. Calculation of standard deviation for both k-Same-closet and k-Same-furthest has excluded the distance at zero as this distance is given by repetitions of the same de-identified face. Fig. 9 illustrates the relationships between the computed facial feature distance and the visual difference displayed between the pair of face images.
2) Test result and result analysis
As shown in Fig. 8 , the distance distributions of the original faces and the k-Diff-furthest (de-identified) faces have very similar outlines, indicating that the diversity of faces in terms of their facial features are kept through the k-Diff-furthest face de-identification process and hence the k-Diff-furthest faces are as distinguishable as their original faces. This is also confirmed by the results in Table I , where the two sets of face images have very similar average and maximum distances. The higher minimum distance from the k-Diff-furthest de-identified faces means that the most similar pair of k-Diff-furthest faces ( Fig.  9(d) ) is more distinguishable than the most similar pair of original faces (Fig. 9(a) ). The higher minimum value has also given k-Diff-furthest faces a slightly smaller standard deviation and a slightly more narrow distribution than the original faces. In contrast to those of the original and the k-Diff-furthest faces, the distance distributions for both the k-Same-closest and the kSame-furthest faces are much more discrete. This reflects the fact that k-Same methods de-identify a cluster of k original faces using the same de-identified face. This is also indicated by the spike at zero in both histograms. In addition, the deidentified faces generated by k-Same methods are the centroids of clusters. The averaging effect of these de-identified faces has led to a much smaller maximum distance and a much more narrow distribution diagram for each k-Same method, implying that faces originally distinctively different have become much less distinguishable when being k-Same de-identified. 
